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Torts

by Phillip Comer Griffeth
Cash V. Morris"
and Christopher R. Breault**
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia tort law between
June 1, 2014 and May 31, 2015.'
I.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

From investigation, complaint, and affidavit, to determining the
standard of pre-trial care, successful medical malpractice litigation
requires practitioners to possess high degrees of competency, expertise,
effort, and strategy. Peril is behind every statute and piece of evidence,
and the viability of claims hinges on complex legal questions, where
ambiguity and uncertainty reign, and minute factual distinctions often
determine the posture and presentation of claims in front of the court
and jury.
For instance, while plaintiffs have a two-year statute of limitations for
filing medical malpractice actions from the date an injury arising from
a negligent act or omission occurred,2 this time period may be tolled by
a defendant's fraud that deters the plaintiff from discovering the
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2. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 (2007).

237

238

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

malpractice.3 Even so, the statute may begin to run again if the patient
seeks treatment from another doctor because she is no longer deterred
from learning the true facts by any conduct of a defendant, "'even if the
other doctor consulted does not diagnose the medical problem as arising
from the defendant's improper treatment."'4
In Gallant v. MacDowell," a dental malpractice case, the Georgia
Supreme Court examined whether the statute of limitations barred a
patient's claim filed on January 26, 2010 against Dr. Steven M. Gallant,
D.D.S., for an allegedly flawed full-mouth prosthodontic reconstruction
performed between mid-August 2006 and January 2008, or whether
alleged fraud tolled the claim despite the plaintiffs consult with a nonparty physician regarding the reconstruction.
The plaintiff alleged that Dr. Gallant knew from the outset that the
foundational implants upon which he would build his prosthesis were
improperly set by a non-party colleague, Dr. Mollie Ann Winston, D.D.S.,
making installation of the prosthesis difficult. Despite this setting, Dr.
Gallant proceeded without the patient's consultation or knowledge,
causing her significant pain that required multiple adjustments, two
consultative referrals back to Dr. Winston and, ultimately, a complete
reconstruction by a third-party dentist, Dr. Hal Arnold.' Only on
February 13, 2008, in her first appointment with Dr. Arnold, did the
patient learn of "the improper placement and angulations of the
implants."'
The plaintiff alleged that because she was unaware of the improperly
placed implants and Dr. Gallant's knowledge of the same until February
2008, pursuant to section 9-3-96 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.),' Dr. Gallant's fraud tolled the statute of limitations.10 The trial court, however, granted the defendant-dentist's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the suit was timebarred by the statute of limitations and that even if there was fraud, "as
of the date [the patient] sought the care of Dr. Winston on January 8,
2008, complaining of the fit and comfort of the prostheses, [the patient]
had thereby 'consulted with another doctor,' and was on notice of the tort

3. See O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2007).
4. Gallant v. MacDowell, 295 Ga. 329, 331, 759 S.E.2d 818, 820 (2014) (quoting
Witherspoon v. Aranas, 254 Ga. App. 609, 614, 562 S.E.2d 853, 858 (2002)).
5. 295 Ga. 329, 759 S.E.2d 818 (2014).
6. Id. at 330-31, 759 S.E.2d at 819-20.
7. Id. at 330, 759 S.E.2d at 819.
8. Id.
9. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96 (2007).
10. Gallant, 259 Ga. at 330-31, 759 S.E.2d at 819-20.
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so that the statute began to run," making her ultimate filing untimely.11
Distinguishing the facts, the court determined that since Dr. Winston
was inextricably involved in the care the patient alleged to be negligent,
jointly with the defendant, she was not an independent doctor rendering
inapplicable the rationale for ending the tolling.12 The court explained:
As Dr. Winston, herself, placed the implants, consulting with Dr.
Winston could not automatically be deemed to have placed [the patient]
on notice of problems with the implants, or Dr. Gallant's opinion that
[the patient's] complaints and the problems associated with the
installation of the prostheses were caused by improper placement of the
implants, but that he failed to disclose this to [the patient]. It cannot
be said that [the patient] was no longer deterred from learning the
alleged true facts as a result of these visits to Dr. Winston."
In a unanimous decision in Gala v. Fisher,4 the Georgia Supreme
Court provided clarity to plaintiffs curing alleged deficiencies in
professional malpractice affidavits."
The trial court incorrectly
interpreted O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.16 to mean the following:
[A] plaintiff cannot comply with [the pleading requirements of]
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 by filing with a medical malpractice complaint an
affidavit given by an expert who is not competent to testify under the
applicable standard and then cure such a deficiency by filing an
amended complaint with an affidavit given by another expert who is
competent to testify. 7
On a writ of certiorari, the court held "O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e) permits
the plaintiff to cure this defect by filing an amended complaint with the
affidavit of a second, competent expert"'" by its plain language: "If a
plaintiff files an affidavit which is allegedly defective . . . the plaintiff
may cure the alleged defect by amendmentpursuantto Code Section 9-1115 within 30 days of service of the motion alleging that the affidavit is
defective." 9 Disagreeing with the defendant and the trial court, the
supreme court found no limitations in the statute requiring the original

11.

Id. at 331, 759 S.E.2d at 820.

12. Id. at 332-33, 759 S.E.2d at 821.
13.

Id. at 332, 759 S.E.2d at 820-21 (footnote omitted).

14. 296 Ga. 870, 770 S.E.2d 879 (2015).
15. Id. at 870, 770 S.E.2d at 880.
16. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e) (2015).
17. Fisher v. Gala, 325 Ga. App. 800, 801-02, 754 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2014), reconsideration denied (Feb. 24, 2014), aff'd, 296 Ga. 870, 770 S.E.2d 879 (2015).
18. Gala, 296 Ga. at 870, 770 S.E.2d at 880.
19. Id. at 874, 770 S.E.2d at 882 (emphasis in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e)).
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affiant to make the curing affidavit with an amendment to the original
affidavit because doing so would be inconsistent with the "general
liberality of pleading allowed under the Civil Practice Act." 2 0 Further,
the court held that this construction was contrary to the supreme court's
previous finding that the section contained "no express limitation on the
nature of the alleged defect subject to remedy." 2
In a decision significantly strengthening the psychiatrist-patient
privilege, and certainly preventing the discovery of documents by
potential claimants of medical malpractice, the Georgia Supreme Court
in Cooksey v. Landry22 reversed a trial court's permanent injunction
directing a psychiatrist to produce a deceased patient's psychiatric
records to his parents to investigate the doctor's care of their son.23
The court, in a comprehensive decision integrating the various statutes
and cases on point, determined the privilege protecting psychiatristpatient communications were inviolate and no production of these
communications would occur without the patient's waiver. 24 Relying
on the plain language of the privileges set forth in O.C.G.A. § 24-5501(a)(8) 25 and the statutes governing the release of records containing
privileged information to a patient's legal representative,2 6 the court
determined the trial court erred in exercising its equitable power to
require production of records without a waiver by the deceased
patient. 27 Acknowledging this result could prevent the disclosure of
relevant evidence in "the pursuit of truth and justice,"2 8 the fivemember majority clearly concluded an inviolate privilege, in life or
death, of a patient's mental health communications from disclosure is
critical to effective mental health treatment and more compelling than
any decedent's representative's right to fully investigate claims against
a mental health provider that could have cost the patient their life. 29
In a case interpreting Georgia's emergency medical care statute,
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5," a surviving spouse sued the decedent's doctor

20.
S.E.2d
21.
S.E.2d
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 875, 770 S.E.2d at 883 (quoting Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649,652,492
665, 668 (1997)); see also Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 to 9-11-133 (2015).
Gala, 296 Ga. at 875, 770 S.E.2d at 883 (quoting Porquez, 268 Ga. at 652 n.3, 492
at 668 n.3).
295 Ga. 430, 761 S.E.2d 61 (2014).
Id. at 431, 761 S.E.2d at 63.
See id. at 432-33, 761 S.E.2d at 64.
O.C.G.A. § 24-5-501(a)(8) (2013 & Supp. 2015).
See O.C.G.A. § 31-33-4 (2012); O.C.G.A. § 37-3-166(a)(8.1) (2012).
Cooksey, 295 Ga. at 434, 761 S.E.2d at 65.
Id. at 435, 761 S.E.2d at 66.
See id. at 436, 761 S.E.2d at 66-67.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 (Supp. 2015).
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and practice group for failure to properly diagnose and treat a bowel
perforation." The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing
that because the claim arose out of the provision of "emergency medical
care in a hospital emergency department" under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5,
the plaintiff was required to meet the heightened evidentiary burden
and show by clear and convincing evidence that the doctor was grossly
negligent in her care and treatment of the decedent.32 The trial court
denied the motion but granted a certificate of immediate review.33
The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in
determining the statute did not apply, but affirmed the denial of
summary judgment "because a question of fact exists as to whether the
plaintiff demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that [the doctor]
was grossly negligent."34 Interpreting and applying the statute, the
trial court focused on the "department of the physician responsible for
the patient's care, not the physical location of the patient in the
hospital,"" and since the doctor was a physician in the critical
care-not emergency-department when he assumed the patient's care
and transferred her to ICU, she was not "in a hospital emergency
department"" for purposes of the statute, even though she continued
to be "temporarily housed there for several hours after she was
transferred to [the doctor's] care."" The court of appeals disagreed."

31. See Nisbet v. Davis, 327 Ga. App. 559, 559, 760 S.E.2d 179, 180 (2014), cert. denied,
2014 Ga. LEXIS 973 (2014); see also Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta/Lowndes Cnty. v. Brinson, 330
Ga. App. 212, 218, 220, 767 S.E.2d 811, 816, 817 (2014) (concluding that whether there is
a "bona fide emergency" so as to implicate O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5 is "not about the [patient's]
'actual condition'. . . . It is whether his medical condition was manifested by acute
symptoms of sufficient severity to trigger the gross negligence standard of O.C.G.A.
§ 51-1-29.5(c)"), reconsiderationdenied (Dec. 5, 2014).
32. Nisbet, 327 Ga. App. at 559, 760 S.E.2d at 180; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5.
33. Nisbet, 327 Ga. App. at 572, 760 S.E.2d at 188.
34. Id. at 559-60, 760 S.E.2d at 180.
35. Id. at 564, 760 S.E.2d at 183.
36. Id. at 563, 760 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c)).
37. Id. at 564, 760 S.E.2d at 183.
38. Id. at 571-72, 760 S.E.2d at 188 (citing Abdel-Samed v. Dailey, 294 Ga. 758, 765-66,
755 S.E.2d 805, 811-12 (2014) (defendants' care and treatment of patient who needed
emergency surgery, where plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to properly transfer
patient to a surgeon, constituted emergency medical care) and Quinney v. Phoebe Putney
Mem'l Hosp., 325 Ga. App. 112, 117-20, 751 S.E.2d 874, 878-81 (2013) (defendants' care of
patient whose health was in serious jeopardy, where plaintiff alleged that defendants failed
to properly diagnose and treat the patient's condition, constituted emergency medical
care)). Interestingly, the plaintiff in Quinney later convinced a jury to rule for the plaintiff
even under the heightened burden of proof. See Alyson M. Palmer, PlaintiffWins $1.486M
FromER Doctor, ClearingHigherNegligence Standard, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REPORT, Oct.
23, 2015, at 1. But see Howland v. Wadsworth, 324 Ga. App. 175, 181, 749 S.E.2d 762, 767
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However, the court could not say as a matter of law that a reasonable
jury would not find by clear and convincing evidence that the doctor
"grossly deviated from the standard of care in her care and treatment"
because the plaintiff had shown facts sufficient to raise a jury question
regarding whether the doctor committed gross negligence."
II.

PREMISES LIABILITY

Ten recent cases from the court of appeals provide a representative
sampling of the strength of evidence needed to survive a summary
judgment motion in a premises liability case: five decided for the
premises owner and five for the plaintiff. Superior knowledge being a
threshold issue in these claims, the first case decided was in favor of the
owner-the defendant challenged the trial court's denial of summary
judgment after "a deck railing gave way and [the plaintiff] fell to the
concrete below.""o The court of appeals reversed, disagreeing with the
application of Hicks v. Walker," but agreeing with the trial court that
the deck's railing was a static condition.4 2 The court noted "that the
deck and railing in question were built by a previous property owner ten
years prior to [the owner]'s purchase of the property and that the county
inspected the improvement soon after its construction." 43 There was
"no evidence by which [the owner] could be said to have superior
44
knowledge of the deck railing's allegedly dangerous condition."
45
Likewise, in Ingles Markets, Inc. v. Carroll the plaintiff failed to
prove the store "had either actual or constructive knowledge of the
hazard at issue" after the plaintiff was injured when a child ran into her
and knocked her down while shopping. 46 The trial court denied the
defense motion for summary judgment, but the court of appeals reversed
on interlocutory appeal.

(2013) (evidence was in conflict as to whether patient "was relatively stable at all times
and [whether] her condition had improved while she was in the emergency room" when
defendants treated her, such that a jury had to decide whether the care received by patient
was emergency medical care), cert. denied (Jan. 27, 2014).
39. Nisbet, 327 Ga. App. at 571-72, 760 S.E.2d at 188.
40. Rogers v. Woodruff, 328 Ga. App. 310, 310, 761 S.E.2d 852, 852 (2014).
41. 262 Ga. App. 216, 585 S.E.2d 83 (2003).
42. Rogers, 328 Ga. App. at 314, 761 S.E.2d at 855.
43. Id. at 316, 761 S.E.2d at 856.
44. Id. at 316, 761 S.E.2d at 857.
45. 329 Ga. App. 365, 765 S.E.2d 45 (2014).
46. Id. at 365-66, 765 S.E.2d at 46-47.
47. Id. at 365, 765 S.E.2d at 46.
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Even if a plaintiff can show a premises owner's knowledge of the
hazard, that knowledge has to be superior to that of the plaintiff.4 For
example, in Milledgeville Manor Partners, LLC v. Lewis, 49 also decided
on interlocutory review, the court determined the undisputed evidence
established as a matter of law that the plaintiff's knowledge of the
hazard was equal or superior to that of the owner, and it therefore
reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment." The plaintiff
was a tenant who stepped into a hole near a clothesline and fell. She
had informed a fellow tenant and another unidentified defendant
employee about the hole roughly two and one-half weeks before the
accident. She claimed she did not see the hole the day of the incident
because grass had grown over the hole and hid it.81
In Seago v. Estate of Earle," in an opinion written by Judge Boggs,
the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendant, as the evidence showed the plaintiff "had
equal knowledge of the hazard that caused his injury but failed to
exercise reasonable care for his own safety" for injuries sustained in a
The plaintiff, who had been working for
four-wheeler accident."
approximately two weeks installing a fence, "was riding a four-wheeler
through a wooded area between the two driveways" when he collided
with a chain installed between two trees on the defendant's property.5 4
The court was persuaded by the plaintiff's deposition testimony of his
"awareness of the existence of the hazard."" In particular, he was
"driving at high speed through an unfamiliar area, while distracted by
looking for tools, and took a shortcut through a narrow opening which
he admit[ted] was obscured by bushes to enter the lane at a sharp
angle."5
Judge Barnes wrote the dissent and quoted Judge Blackburn's dissent
in a case from 1996, stating that the "'decisions of this Court have so
twisted, limited, and misapplied certain holdings of the Supreme Court
of Georgia as to create a gauntlet of premises liability analysis through

48. See Milledgeville Manor Partners, LLC v. Lewis, 328 Ga. App. 482,483,763 S.E.2d
723, 724 (2014).
49. 328 Ga. App. 482, 763 S.E.2d 723 (2014).
50. Id. at 482, 763 S.E.2d at 723 (citing Lands Ass'n v. Williams, 291 Ga. 397, 397, 728
S.E.2d 577, 579 (2012), discussed in Phillip Comer Griffeth & Cash V. Morris, Torts,
Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 65 MERCER L. REV. 265, 272-74 (2013).
51. Id. at 482-83, 763 S.E.2d at 723-24.
52. 331 Ga. App. 699, 771 S.E.2d 397 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 512 (2015).
53. Id. at 699, 771 S.E.2d at 398. The court applied an invitee standard of care. Id.
54. Id. at 700, 771 S.E.2d at 399.
55. Id. at 701, 771 S.E.2d at 399.
56. Id. at 702, 771 S.E.2d at 400.
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which plaintiffs almost certainly cannot pass."' 57 Citing Robinson v.
Kroger Co.58 and American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown," the frustrated dissent in Seago believed "the question of whether or not [the
plaintiff] exercised ordinary care on his own behalf, and whether and to
what extent he was contributorily negligent, was for the jury to
determine."6 o
In CanaanLand Properties, Inc. v. Herrington,6 a panel reversed, on
interlocutory appeal, a trial court's denial of a defense motion for
summary judgment when the plaintiff fell on uneven pavement in the
parking lot of a store, finding the plaintiff "failed to point to evidence
establishing that the uneven pavement caused him to fall."6 2 The court
relied heavily on the plaintiff's own deposition testimony regarding the
cause of the fall as well as the deposition of a store employee that the
indentation or divot in the pavement had been there "for some time.""
The court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's investigator's opinion on
what caused the injury when the investigator had no expertise in
reconstructing incidents and his inspection occurred two years after the
incident."
The plaintiff succeeded in Strauss v. City of Lilburn," when the same
panel that decided Lewis" reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the city, finding genuine issues of material fact existed
regarding the plaintiff's knowledge of the specific hazard causing her
fall.67 The plaintiff was eating lunch at a caf6 located along a renovated sidewalk owned by the city. Upper and lower areas of the sidewalk
were constructed of the same material connected by a single-step riser.

57. Id. at 702-03, 771 S.E.2d at 400 (quoting Blake v. Kroger Co., 224 Ga. App. 140,
153, 480 S.E.2d 199, 208 (1996) (Blackburn, J., dissenting)). Judge Blackburn wrote the
dissent and was joined by Judge Miller. Id.
58. 268 Ga. 735, 493 S.E.2d 403 (1997); see also Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 205
n.119; Griffeth & Morris, supra note 50, at 270 n.41-42.
59. 285 Ga. 442, 679 S.E.2d 25 (2009).
60. Seago, 331 Ga. App. at 705, 771 S.E.2d at 402.
61. 330 Ga. App. 17, 766 S.E.2d 493 (2014).
62. Id. at 17, 766 S.E.2d at 493-94.
63. Id. at 18-19, 766 S.E.2d at 494-95.
64. Id. at 20, 766 S.E.2d at 495. The court distinguished Pennington v. WJL, LLC, 263
Ga. App. 758, 589 S.E.2d 259 (2003), and instead relied upon Taylor v. ThunderbirdLanes,
LLC, 324 Ga. App. 167, 748 S.E.2d 308 (2013), reconsiderationdenied (Oct. 9, 2013); Bryan
Bank & Trust v. Steele, 326 Ga. App. 13, 755 S.E.2d 828 (2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga.
LEXIS 645 (2014); and Willingham Loan & Realty Co. v. Washington, 311 Ga. App. 535,
716 S.E.2d 585 (2011). Herrington, 330 Ga. App. at 21 n.10, 766 S.E.2d at 496 n.10.
65. 329 Ga. App. 361, 765 S.E.2d 49 (2014).
66. 328 Ga. App. at 482, 763 S.E.2d at 723.
67. 329 Ga. App. at 361, 765 S.E.2d at 50.
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Leaving the caf6, the plaintiff approached the single-step riser to cross
the street to return to her car and tripped." The plaintiff retained an
expert witness who testified that the riser was a "camouflaged hazard"
because it was not delineated. The caf6 owner also testified that the
step was "'invisible' on sunny days, so much so that it appears
'continuous' or like 'one flat surface' when walking down towards the
street."69 The trial court found the plaintiff had equal knowledge of the
hazard, but the appeals court likened the case to American MultiCinema, Inc.,7o finding that "whether [the plaintiff] exercised ordinary
care for her own safety and whether she had greater or equal knowledge
of the specific hazard posed by the single-step riser are questions of fact
to be resolved at trial."n
In Henderson v. St. Paul Baptist Church,72 a trial court's grant of
summary judgment was reversed when issues of fact remained "as to
whether [the church] failed to keep its premises safe and failed to warn
[the plaintiff] of a known, hidden hazard on its property" and "whether
[the plaintiff] encountered the hidden hazard when she attempted to
take a shortcut to the side entrance of the church, rather than walking
on the designated approach to the church's main entrance."" The court
concluded the plaintiffs had shown the defendant's actual or constructive
knowledge of the hazard.74 As to the plaintiff's own voluntary or causal
negligence, the court determined the plaintiff "raised an issue of fact for
the jury as to whether [the plaintiff] chose to step onto the pine straw
rather than remain on a safer path in her attempt to proceed to the
church" and, therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate.7 5
In Smith v. Tenet Health System Spalding, Inc.,76 the court reversed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, holding
the evidence supported "an inference that [plaintiff's] fall was caused by
a foreign substance on the floor that the [defendant] employee could

68. Id. at 361-62, 765 S.E.2d at 50-51.
69. Id. at 362, 765 S.E.2d at 51.
70. 285 Ga. at 442, 679 S.E.2d at 25.
71. Id. at 364-65, 765 S.E.2d at 52. The court also cited, among other cases, Pinderv.
H & H Food Services, LLC, 326 Ga. App. 493, 756 S.E.2d 721 (2014), which reversed a
grant of summary judgment in a static defect or condition case-a handicap ramp-in
which questions of fact remained regarding the plaintiffs negligence. Strauss, 329 Ga.
App. at 364-65, 765 S.E.2d at 52-53; see also Pinder, 326 Ga. App. at 497, 503, 756 S.E.2d
at 725, 728.
72. 328 Ga. App. 123, 761 S.E.2d 533 (2014).
73. Id. at 123, 761 S.E.2d at 535.
74. Id. at 126, 761 S.E.2d at 536.
75. Id. at 126-27, 761 S.E.2d at 537.
76. 327 Ga. App. 878, 761 S.E.2d 409 (2014).
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have prevented or noticed and removed."" Further, the plaintiff was
able to show the defendant's constructive knowledge of the hazard since
the defendant's "janitorial contractor was in the immediate vicinity of
the fall and had an opportunity to prevent or to correct the hazardous
condition of a wet floor shortly prior to [the plaintiff's] fall." 78
In Hill v. Kone, Inc.," Judge Doyle wrote for the panel and reversed
a trial court's grant of summary judgment when factual issues remained
in a trip and fall suit against an elevator maintenance company
regarding a potential statutory violation that would give rise to a
spoliation presumption.8 o The court agreed with the plaintiff that "the
record contain[ed] factual issues as to whether the proper elevator was
taken out of service and inspected as required by O.C.G.A. § 8-2-106(c),
which issues give rise to a spoliation presumption precluding summary
judgment.""
Finally, in Emory Healthcare, Inc. v. Pardue,82 the plaintiff, a
psychiatric patient with a history of dementia, slipped and fell on the
floor of her room. 3 The trial court granted summary judgment on the
premises liability claim, but denied summary judgment on the ordinary
negligence claim, and the case resulted in a plaintiff's jury verdict that
the court of appeals affirmed.84 Based on the plaintiff's documents
from her admission to the inpatient psychiatric unit and evaluations, a
nurse knew the plaintiff to be at risk for a fall. As the nurse and
nursing assistant were walking to the bathroom, the plaintiff urinated
on the floor. During the process of cleaning-up, the plaintiff got up,
walked across the wet bathroom floor into her room, and fell. The

77. Id. at 880, 761 S.E.2d at 412.
78. Id. at 881, 761 S.E.2d at 412.
79. 329 Ga. App. 716, 766 S.E.2d 120 (2014).
80. Id. at 716, 766 S.E.2d at 121.
81. Id. at 718, 766 S.E.2d at 122. O.C.G.A. § 8-2-106 addresses elevator accidents and
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) The [building] owner or lessee shall report, by telephone, to the enforcement
authority on the same day or by noon on the next work day, . . . all elevator ...
related accidents involving personal injury or death. The owner or lessee shall
also provide a written report of this accident within seven days.
(c) Any elevator ... involved in an accident described in subsection (a) ... of this
Code section shall be removed from service at the time of the accident. The
equipment shall not be repaired, altered, or placed back in service until inspected
by a certified inspector for the enforcement authority.
O.C.G.A. § 8-2-106 (2015).
82. 328 Ga. App. 664, 760 S.E.2d 674 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (July 31, 2014).
83. Id. at 664, 760 S.E.2d at 676.
84. Id. at 664, 674, 760 S.E.2d at 676-77. 682.
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defendant moved for summary judgment on the negligence claim,
arguing the claims sounded only in professional, and not ordinary,
negligence."
Interestingly, the trial court denied the motion and held a bench trial,
determining that although the statute of limitation for a negligence
claim had elapsed, the plaintiff was not competent at the time of her
injury and, thus, the statute of limitation was tolled. The case then
proceeded to a jury trial on the ordinary negligence claim. 6 Writing
for the court, Judge Ray relied on three prior cases and held that "a jury
could, without the help of expert testimony, find that the nurses and the
nursing assistant failed to exercise ordinary care by leaving Plaintiff
unattended in the bathroom while they cleaned her room."" "Simply
because a patient's injury occurs in a hospital setting or calls into
question the actions of a medical professional does not mean that a suit
88
to recover for that injury is necessarily a 'medical malpractice' action."
The court also rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court erred
in denying its request to take judicial notice of certain findings of fact
and conclusions of law in the trial court's summary judgment order,
finding that while "'[a] trial court may take judicial notice of its own records[,]"' a trial court cannot take judicial notice of matters that are the
subject of proof in the case."
III.

VIcARIOuS LIABILITY

In Ambling Management Co., LLC v. Miller,"o the Georgia Supreme
Court considered the relevant time period for evaluating evidence of
when an off-duty police officer is acting as a public agent or at the
direction of a private employer."' If an officer's actions are directed by
his private employer, the private employer is vicariously liable for the

85. Id. at 665-66, 760 S.E.2d at 676-77.
86. Id. at 666, 760 S.E.2d at 676-77.
87. Id. at 668, 760 S.E.2d at 678; see also Brown v. Tift Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 280 Ga.
App. 847, 635 S.E.2d 184 (2006); Brown v. Durden, 195 Ga. App. 340, 393 S.E.2d 450
(1990); Donson Nursing Facilities v. Dixon, 176 Ga. App. 700, 337 S.E.2d 351 (1985).
88. Pardue, 328 Ga. App. at 666, 760 S.E.2d at 677.
89. Id. at 669-70, 760 S.E.2d at 679 (alterations in original) (quoting Lee v. State Const.
Indus. Licensing Bd. of Ga., 205 Ga. App. 497, 423 S.E.2d 26 (1992) (citations omitted)).
Further, the court found no error in the trial court's admission of the plaintiffs daughter's
testimony, regarding speaking with a nurse the morning after the fall, or its allowance of
medical expenses evidence to be submitted to the jury without expert testimony to
establish that the costs were related to the fall (relying on O.C.G.A. § 24-9-921 (2013)).
Id. at 673, 760 S.E.2d at 681.
90. 295 Ga. 758, 764 S.E.2d 127 (2014).
91. Id. at 758-59, 764 S.E.2d at 128.
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off-duty officer's actions.92 In Ambling Management, an "off-duty
POST-certified" city police officer, employed by Ambling Management to
patrol an apartment complex, shot the plaintiff.93 The trial court
granted Ambling Management's motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiff's claim for vicarious liability because "there was no evidence
that the apartment or management company had directed [the off-duty
officer's] actions at the time the cause of action arose."
The court of appeals reversed because "there was some evidence that
[the off-duty officer] was performing duties directed" by the apartment
complex or managing company." The Georgia Supreme Court upheld
the reversal of summary judgment despite finding the factual analysis
by the court of appeals "erroneously limited in focus and scope."96
According to the supreme court, the court of appeals erred by focusing
only on the off-duty officer's actions at the time he initially engaged the
plaintiff." The proper analysis of the officer's capacity-whether it be
policeman, servant, or dual-should have considered the officer's actions
after the initial engagement." Specifically, the court of appeals only
considered whether the officer's decision to approach the plaintiff was
directed by his private employer, failing to consider the officer's capacity
in any of the subsequent, allegedly tortious conduct.99 The supreme
court noted the relevance of the officer's reasons for initially approaching

92.

Id. at 761, 764 S.E.2d at 130 ("If a man is a policeman, and he has no duties to

discharge, except police duties, proper for the public,-if he is acting as a public policeman
and nothing else,-the mere fact that the company pays for his services does not make him
the agent of the railway company. The company may become liable for his torts by
directing them, even though he be a public officer") (quoting Pounds v. Cent. of Georgia Ry.
Co., 142 Ga. 415, 83 S.E. 96 (1914)).
93. Id. at 758, 764 S.E.2d at 128.
94. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added). Fisher was an officer dressed in his
APD uniform, but he arrived at the complex in his personal vehicle. He observed plaintiff
Miller park in a handicap space and enter the building. Fisher walked over to Miller's
vehicle and looked inside using his flashlight and did not see a handicap tag or sticker.
Fisher also did not see any contraband. Fisher returned to his car. Upon Miller's return,
Fisher testified that he approached Miller's car to discuss the complex's policy of keeping
handicap spaces clear. Fisher said he tapped on the car window to get Miller's attention
and saw Miller put what appeared to be crack cocaine in his mouth. According to Fisher,
as Miller was putting the alleged drugs in his mouth and slowly backing up the car, he
made a decision to arrest Miller. When his commands went unheeded, he broke the
driver's side window and, then believing Miller had a weapon, shot him. Id. at 760, 764
S.E.2d at 129.
95. Id. at 759, 764 S.E.2d at 128.
96. Id. at 765, 764 S.E.2d at 132.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 763, 764 S.E.2d at 131.
99. Id. at 764, 764 S.E.2d at 132.
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'

the plaintiff to the question of the officer's capacity, but held that the
court of appeals erroneously limited its factual inquiry to only those
facts. 00 The court's holding was to keep "with the recognition that a
special policeman's capacity can change over the course of an encounter
with a plaintiff."' 0
In a similar case, the court of appeals, in Graham v. City of Duluth,10 2 addressed whether the City of Duluth used reasonable care in
pre-screening one of its officers before hiring him and whether the
tortious actions of the officer, who was off-duty at the time of the
incident, were "wholly unrelated" to his employment as a police
officer.'0o In Graham, an off-duty police officer made several objective
displays of authority to the plaintiff, "including telling her that he was
a police officer, putting on his vest with his radio attached, showing her
his badge, and instructing her to summon him help."'0 4 The off-duty
officer, who was also intoxicated at the time, then attacked her "with his
Department-issued pepper spray before engaging in a shootout with his
Department-issued service weapon, striking Graham's car and a fellow
officer who came to the scene to help."' 0 ' The plaintiff then brought,
among other claims, a negligent hiring claim against the City.1 6
The City of Duluth had no knowledge of the "neighborhood incident"
that happened just a few weeks before the off-duty officer was hired.07
During the "neighborhood incident," the off-duty officer was involuntarily
committed to the hospital after an incident in his neighborhood in which
he was "highly intoxicated, [and] brandished his service weapon and two
other weapons in front of his neighbors.""' During this incident, the
neighbors retreated inside and called the police when the off-duty officer
became "very angry."'o Ten minutes after the officers convinced him
to return home "to sleep and sober up," he went back outside and shined
his flashlight into his neighbors' windows, and the police were sum-

100. Id.
101. Id. at 763, 764 S.E.2d at 131.
102. 328 Ga. App. 496, 759 S.E.2d 645 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (July 28, 2014),
cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 32 (2015).
103. Id. at 502, 506, 759 S.E.2d at 651, 653.
104. Id. at 506, 759 S.E.2d at 653.
105. Id. at 496, 506, 759 S.E.2d at 647, 653.
106. Id. at 496, 759 S.E.2d at 647.
107. Id. at 502-03, 759 S.E.2d at 651.
108. Id. at 498, 759 S.E.2d at 648.
109. Id.
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moned again."o The officers arrested him and took him to the hospital
after he became "belligerent and combative.""'
The trial court granted summary judgment on the plaintiff's negligent
hiring claim, finding no evidence that the off-duty officer "had ever
inappropriately discharged his pepper spray or committed an assault on
an innocent civilian" before this incident.11 2 The court of appeals,
however, held that the trial court's standard was too narrow." The
court stated, "to establish the vicarious liability of the employer for the
employee's acts, it must be reasonably foreseeable from the employee's
'tendencies' or propensities that the employee could cause the type of
harm sustained by the plaintiff."" 4 Even though the City did not have
actual knowledge of the off-duty officer's propensity to be belligerent, a
jury could reasonably conclude that a more thorough review of his record
may mean the City "'might have foreseen that personal injury would
an officer with [his] history."'
result from hiring ...
The court noted, however, that "even for employers who should have
known of the dangerous propensities of an employee, they will not be
liable if the employee acts on those propensities in a setting or circumstances wholly unrelated to his employment.""
Because the officer
made several objective displays of authority and presented himself as an
officer to the plaintiff, a jury could reasonably decide whether the offduty officer's actions were "wholly unrelated" to his employment or
not. 1 7

In a case dealing with parent-child vicarious liability, the Georgia
Court of Appeals addressed, in Boston v. Athearn,"5 whether a jury
could reasonably conclude that the parents negligently supervised their
son after they allowed his libelous posts on a fake Facebook page to
remain on display eleven months after they learned of the posts.1 9
The defendants' thirteen-year-old son had created a social networking

110. Id.
111. Id. at 499, 759 S.E.2d at 648.
112. Id. at 505, 759 S.E.2d at 652.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 505, 759 S.E.2d at 652-53 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d
604, 606 (2004)).
115. See id. at 505-06, 759 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Govea v. City of Norcross, 271 Ga.
App. 36, 49, 608 S.E.2d 677, 687 (2004)).
116. Id. at 506, 759 S.E.2d at 653 (emphasis added) (quoting TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc.
v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 462, 590 S.E.2d 807, 815 (2003)).
117. Id.
118. 329 Ga. App. 890, 764 S.E.2d 582 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (Nov. 21, 2014).
119. Id. at 896, 764 S.E.2d at 587.
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page of one of the plaintiffs, who was the daughter of the other two
plaintiffs, without the plaintiffs' permission.1 2 0 Posing as the minorplaintiff, the defendant-son posted status updates that "falsely stated
that [the plaintiff-minor] was on a medication regimen for mental health
disorders and that she took illegal drugs." 2' Although the defendantparents learned of their son's actions-after the principal called the
parents to discuss why she suspended their son for two days-the
unauthorized profile and posts remained on display.1 22
The trial court granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim of
the defendant's failure to supervise or control their son by allowing him
to continue using the computer and by not requiring him to take down
the unauthorized profile.' 23 The court of appeals reiterated, however,
that "[u]nder Georgia law, liability for the tort of a minor child is not
imputed to the child's parents merely on the basis of the parent-child
relationship," but that "[p]arents may be held directly liable. . . for their
own negligence in failing to supervise or control their child with regard

to conduct which poses an unreasonable risk of harming others."'2 4
The court held, "Given the nature of libel, the original tortious conduct
may continue to unfold as .

.

. the defamatory content persists in a

public forum without public correction or retraction." 2 5 Thus, the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim for
negligent supervision. 126

120. Id. at 891, 764 S.E.2d at 583.
121. Id. at 891, 764 S.E.2d at 584.
122. Id. at 892, 764 S.E.2d at 584.
123. Id. at 890, 764 S.E.2d at 583.
124. Id. at 893, 764 S.E.2d at 585 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing Corley
v. Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 748, 182 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1971) (other than what the statute
provides, "causes of action against the parents of minor tortfeasors are rooted in the
common law [of Georgia] and are predicated on something more than the mere parent-child
relationship") and Assurance Co. of Am. v. Bell, 108 Ga. App. 766, 766-67, 134 S.E.2d 540,
540-41 (1963) ("A parent may be guilty of primary negligence in failing to exercise
reasonable care to prevent a child under his control from creating an unreasonable risk of
harm to third persons, where he has knowledge of facts from which he should reasonabl[y]
anticipate that harm will otherwise result.")).
125. Id. at 896, 764 S.E.2d at 587.
126. Id. For another interesting case concerning torts in the internet age, see Internet
Brands, Inc. v. Jape, 328 Ga. App. 272, 760 S.E.2d 1 (2014), in which the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012), barred plaintiffs defamation claim. Id.
at 272-73, 760 S.E.2d at 1.
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OFFER OF JUDGMENT

The Georgia Supreme Court recently informed litigants on the
application of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6817 in two cases. Commonly known as
the "offer of settlement" statute, the Georgia General Assembly enacted
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 to purportedly encourage litigants in tort cases to
seek compromise and avoid unnecessary litigation in furtherance of
Georgia's public policy encouraging negotiation and settlements. 1 2 8
The statute allows a party to make a settlement offer to the opposing
party that, if rejected, exposes the opposing party to a penalty of
"reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of litigation" incurred from the
date of the rejection to the entry of judgment.1 29 When the offeror is
the plaintiff, the plaintiff must recover a judgment greater than 125%
30
A
of the amount offered in order to recover the statutory fees.o
defendant is entitled to statutory fees when the plaintiff recovers less
than 75% of the amount offered by the defendant.'
The first case, Georgia Department of Corrections v. Couch,1 82
clarified that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 applies to entities covered by the
Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA)"' and addressed the proper calculation of reasonable attorney fees under the statute.1 3 4 The plaintiff,
Couch, was an inmate painting a warden's house when he fell from a
rotted joist and severed his urethra. He sued the Georgia Department
of Corrections (Department) and submitted an offer of settlement
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68. The Department did not respond within
the thirty-day time limit, rendering the offer rejected pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(c). After proceeding to trial and obtaining a verdict
125% greater than the offer, Couch demanded attorney fees and
litigation expenses.
The two issues before the supreme court were whether sovereign
immunity protected the Department from the penalties of O.C.G.A. § 911-68 and, if not, whether the court properly calculated the award of
attorney fees against the Department.'"' The Department asserted

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (2015).
See Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 24, 694 S.E.2d 83, 84 (2010).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b).
Id.
Id.
295 Ga. 469, 759 S.E.2d 804 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (July 11, 2014).
O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2013 & Supp. 2014).
Couch, 295 Ga. at 482, 759 S.E.2d at 814-15.
Id. at 469-70, 759 S.E.2d at 806-07.
Id. at 469, 759 S.E.2d at 806.
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that while sovereign immunity for Couch's personal injuries had been
waived, sovereign immunity for the attorney fees and litigation expenses
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 had not been waived.'3 ' The supreme
court rejected the Department's argument. 1 38 First, the court reasoned
that the penalties imposed by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 did not fall within the
term "claim" as defined by the GTCA or create an independent cause of
action. 3 s The court determined the potential penalties of O.C.G.A. § 911-68 are "wholly dependent" on the parties' conduct during the
underlying tort action and may be sought only in connection with such
an action.140 Therefore, the General Assembly did not intend to allow
the state, when it has waived sovereign immunity and allowed a tort
action to proceed against it, to avoid the consequences under the Civil
Practice Act (CPA)141 that other civil litigants face for improper
litigation conduct-including an award of attorney fees and litigation
expenses under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b) for rejecting a reasonable
settlement offer and pursuing further unnecessary litigation.' 42 In
expressly clarifying that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 applies to entities covered
by the GTCA, the court held that when an entity has waived sovereign
immunity to allow a tort action to proceed against it, it may be subject
to reasonable attorney fees and expenses of litigation pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68.43
The supreme court next turned to whether the amount awarded to the
plaintiff under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 was properly calculated.' 4 4 The trial
court had conducted a hearing on the attorney fees during which the
court received evidence on the 40% contingency fee agreement between
the plaintiff and counsel, the hours worked by counsel, and the rates
charged by counsel. The court awarded 40% of the final judgment as
attorney fees.' 4 ' The supreme court reviewed the record and found no
indication that the trial court actually considered evidence of the hours
worked and rates charged by counsel when making its decision.' 4 6
While the trial court was entitled to consider Couch's contingency fee
agreement with his counsel, the supreme court held that the trial court

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 473-74, 759 S.E.2d at 808-09.
Id. at 482, 759 S.E.2d at 815.
Id. at 476, 759 S.E.2d at 811.
Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-1 to -133 (2015).
Couch, 295 Ga. at 478-79, 759 S.E.2d at 812-13.
Id. at 482, 759 S.E.2d at 814-15.
Id. at 482, 759 S.E.2d at 815.
Id.
Id.
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erred by exclusively relying on the contingency agreement in calculating
the award of reasonable attorney fees.""
The supreme court determined that the trial court's calculation was
erroneous in a second regard because the trial court awarded all of the
plaintiff's attorney fees while O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 only authorizes the
award of attorney fees "from the date of the rejection of the offer of
settlement through the entry of judgment."4 8 The court of appeals
noted the limitation imposed by the statute, but nonetheless upheld the
award based on the logic that the fees were fixed by the contingency
agreement between the plaintiff and his counsel.' 49 The supreme court
reversed, reasoning that such a result would plainly disregard the time
limitation imposed by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 and lead to an absurd result
in which parties could avoid the express limitations imposed by the
statute simply by virtue of the contract with their attorney.150 Thus,
the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court for recalculation
of the reasonable value of the professional services that Couch's
attorneys actually provided during the period from the rejection date of
the settlement offer through the entry of judgment.'
In summary, the court's decision clarified two aspects of calculating
attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68. First, the supreme court made
it clear that while a contingency fee agreement may be used to assess
the amount of reasonable attorney fees to award under section 9-11-68,
the agreement should not be the only evidence relied upon in reaching
a decision. Second, the existence of a contingency fee agreement does
not entitle a party to an award for the full amount of the contingency fee
as measured from the total recovery; rather, for awarding attorney fees
under section 9-11-68, courts must look to the statutorily imposed time
limitation to calculate reasonable attorney fees.
The second illuminating case on the offer of settlement statute was
5
in which the Georgia
Crane Composites, Inc. v. Wayne Farms, LLC,"'
Supreme Court considered whether the statute could be applied to a tort
action in which the injury occurred prior to the effective date of the
statute, yet the action was commenced after the effective date of the
statute.1 5 3 In the case, a chicken processing plant owner sued an
interior panel manufacturer after a fire broke out at his facility. The

147. Id.
148. Id. at 485, 759 S.E.2d at 816-17.
149. See id. at 485, 759 S.E.2d at 817.
150. Id. at 485-86, 759 S.E.2d at 817-18.
151. Id. at 486, 759 S.E.2d at 818.
152. 296 Ga. 271, 765 S.E.2d 921 (2014).
153. Id. at 271, 765 S.E.2d at 922.
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fire occurred in 2003, and the plant owner filed suit against the
manufacturer three years later, which was after the effective date of the
The manufacturer made an offer of
offer of settlement statute.
settlement, which was rejected by the plant owner, and after a defense
verdict for the manufacturer, the defendant moved for attorney fees and
litigation expenses under section 9-11-68.154 Relying on the Georgia
Court of Appeals decision in L.P. Gas Industrial Equipment Co. v.
Burch,"' barring the application of section 9-11-68 to tort actions
where the injury occurred prior to the effective date of section 9-11-68,
the trial court denied the manufacturer's request for attorney fees. The
manufacturer appealed, and a divided court of appeals transferred the
case to the Georgia Supreme Court.15 6
The supreme court reversed the trial court's order and overruled L.P.
Gas.' In L.R Gas, the court of appeals held that section 9-11-68
could not be applied retroactively because the statute acts as substantive
law and the substantive rights of the parties were fixed when the injury
occurred.'"' Citing its decision in Couch, the supreme court explained
that the court of appeals incorrectly analyzed the application of section
9-11-68 because while the statute creates substantive rights, those rights
relate to attorney fees and expenses arising from litigation, not from the
underlying injury."' Therefore, when litigation commences after the
effective date of section 9-11-68, the statute applies prospectively rather
The filing of the lawsuit is the crucial event
than retrospectively.'
for the offer of settlement statute because "the rights created by the
statute pertain to attorney fees and expenses arising out of litigation,
6
not damages stemming from injury."' 1

V.

CONCLUSION

As foreshadowed in last year's survey,'6 2 increasing case loads in the
appellate courts gained traction in the final days of the Georgia General
Assembly, resulting in legislation expanding the Georgia Court of
Appeals and pay raises for judges across the state:

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
306 Ga. App. 156, 701 S.E.2d 602 (2010).
Crane, 296 Ga. at 272, 765 S.E.2d at 922.
Id. at 271, 765 S.E.2d at 922.
306 Ga. App. at 158-59, 701 S.E.2d at 604.
Crane, 296 Ga. at 273, 765 S.E.2d at 923.
Id.
Id.
Griffeth & Morris, supra note 1, at 210.
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The state Legislature earlier this year created the three new judgeships, effective Jan. 1. The expansion of the court from 12 to 15 is
supposed to ease the caseload of a court that is small in number
compared with intermediate appellate courts of states with similar
population sizes. There also has been some discussion of shifting
jurisdiction over certain cases from the state Supreme Court to the
Court of Appeals.'
Once the Governor names the new appellate judges,' 6 4 next year's

survey will allow the authors to evaluate how the staffing changes effect
future panels and, if the three-judge panels cannot agree, if more cases
are, in fact, heard by the whole court.

163. Alyson M. Palmer, Nominations for Court ofAppeals Are Due by Sept. 1, FULTON
CNTY. DAILY REPORT, Aug. 13, 2015, at 1; see also Alyson M. Palmer, Commission Explores
JurisdictionalShift Between Appeals Courts, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REPORT, Oct. 26, 2015,
at 1.
164. Governor Deal announced his appointments on October 29, 2015: Appalachian
Circuit Superior Court Judge Amanda Mercier; Nels Peterson, the Georgia university
system's top lawyer; and Mountain Circuit District Attorney Brian Rickman. Alyson M.
Palmer, Gov. Nathan Deal Names New Appeals Court Judges, FULTON CNTY. DAILY
REPORT, Oct. 29, 2015.

